Abstract:
This article examines the probability that the United States, together with its allied coalition, might initiate a military strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran by targeting its nuclear facilities and uranium enrichment centers. Using a comparative framework that draws parallels with the U.S. campaign against Saddam Hussein and analyzing current justifications for military intervention, we assess the implications of the so-called “maximum pressure” strategy. Special attention is given to the unverified statement reportedly released on March 12, 2025, during a closed-door UN Security Council meeting, as well as European criticisms regarding the premature execution of snap-back sanctions. We also discuss the Iranian leadership’s staunch rejection of President Trump’s letter—a move interpreted by some as part of a “scorched earth” policy intended to leave a legacy for a post-Islamic Republic regime. Finally, our study outlines the methodology used to estimate the probability of military engagement and discusses key variables affecting this outcome.
Methodology: Comparative Historical Analysis
We begin by comparing the current geopolitical and military rhetoric with that of the U.S. intervention in Iraq (2003). By reviewing archived statements, military documents, and scholarly analyses, we identify key patterns and justifications used to legitimize previous military actions.
Statistical Modeling and Risk Assessment
A risk assessment model was developed using historical data and expert opinions. Techniques such as Monte Carlo simulations and sensitivity analyses were employed to estimate the probability of a U.S.-led strike. Critical variables include:
The rate of increase in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile (as reported by the IAEA)
The intensity of U.S. “maximum pressure” policies
European responses regarding the snap-back mechanism
The political messaging from both U.S. and Iranian leadership
Content Analysis
We analyzed the content of statements released during the March 2025 UN Security Council meeting and President Trump’s communications using qualitative content analysis methods to extract themes and justifications
Introduction:
In recent years, the geopolitics of the Middle East have been increasingly defined by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the corresponding U.S. strategy of “maximum pressure.” With growing international tensions, there is widespread concern that the United States, along with its coalition partners, may resort to military strikes—potentially through air attacks targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This article aims to estimate the likelihood of such an escalation by comparing current conditions with historical precedents, notably the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which led to the downfall of Saddam Hussein). Additionally, we explore the rationale behind U.S. justifications for military action, the implications of the March 12, 2025, closed-door UN Security Council meeting, and the controversial rejection of President Trump’s letter by Iran’s Supreme Leader, which some argue signals an intention to leave behind a “burnt-out” legacy for future regimes.
Literature Review:
U.S. Military Justifications in Past Interventions
Historical analyses show that U.S. administrations have often justified military interventions by citing threats to international peace and security. For instance, during the campaign against Saddam Hussein, official statements and media reports (Reuters, BBC) highlighted the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and regional instability.
The March 2025 UN Security Council Meeting
Recent reports from news outlets, including VOA News and WANA News Agency, describe a closed-door session held on March 12, 2025, during which concerns were raised about Iran’s increased uranium enrichment. These reports mention an unverified statement (quoted below) that accuses Iran of “flagrantly defying the Security Council” and calls for a united stance against its actions.
In its most recent quarterly reports on Iran’s nuclear activities, dated 26 February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity—near the 90 percent purity level considered weapon-grade—had risen significantly during the reporting period, increasing by approximately 50 percent. The IAEA also found that Iran had increased its enrichment capacity by installing new advanced centrifuges at several of its nuclear facilities. Using stronger language than is typical for these reports, the Agency said that the “significantly increased production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern”. An independent technical assessment of the IAEA’s February reports estimated that Iran now has enough 60 percent-enriched uranium to produce seven nuclear weapons if enriched further.
Security Consile report-Iran (Non-proliferation): Private Meeting
European Perspectives on Snap-Back Sanctions
European media and policy analyses (Reuters, Financial Times) have also expressed concerns over the potential premature reimposition of sanctions (snap-back mechanism), viewing such moves as a politically driven escalation that could increase the likelihood of military conflict.
Reactions to Trump’s Letter and Iranian Policy
Multiple reports from Iranian sources such as IRNA and Tabnak indicate that some interpret Iran’s refusal to accept President Trump’s letter as evidence of a “scorched earth” strategy. This rejection is seen as an effort to leave behind a legacy of a devastated country for future regimes.
Monte Carlo Simulation for Estimating the Strike Probability
In order to quantitatively assess the likelihood of a U.S.-led military strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran, we implement a Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation considers multiple geopolitical variables and their associated uncertainties, and it provides an estimate based on a large number of random scenarios.
Defining the Variables
We model the following key factors:
Uranium Stockpile Increase (X):
We assume that the increase in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile over a three‐month period follows a normal distribution.
Let X∼N(μ,σ2)X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)X∼N(μ,σ2), where, for instance, μ=92.5\mu = 92.5μ=92.5 kg (the reported increase) and σ=10\sigma = 10σ=10 kg.
Maximum Pressure Factor (Y):
This variable represents the intensity of the “maximum pressure” policy pursued by the U.S.
We assume YYY follows a uniform distribution over [0,1][0, 1][0,1], where a higher value indicates more aggressive pressure.
Snap-Back Sanctions Effectiveness (Z):
This variable captures the effectiveness (or premature implementation) of snap-back sanctions as perceived by European and international actors.
Similarly, ZZZ is modeled as a uniform random variable over [0,1][0, 1][0,1], with higher values signifying more effective (or politically motivated) sanctions.
Constructing the Risk Metric
We define an aggregate risk metric RRR that combines these variables:
R=a⋅Xnorm+b⋅Y+c⋅(1−Z)R = a \cdot X_{\text{norm}} + b \cdot Y + c \cdot (1 – Z)R=a⋅Xnorm+b⋅Y+c⋅(1−Z)XnormX_{\text{norm}}Xnorm is the normalized value of XXX, computed as: Xnorm=X−μσX_{\text{norm}} = \frac{X – \mu}{\sigma}Xnorm=σX−μ
The weights aaa, bbb, and ccc (with a+b+c=1a + b + c = 1a+b+c=1) represent the relative importance of each factor. For example, we might choose a=0.4a = 0.4a=0.4, b=0.3b = 0.3b=0.3, and c=0.3c = 0.3c=0.3.
A strike is predicted in a simulation iteration if RRR exceeds a certain threshold TTT. The threshold TTT can be set based on expert judgment—for instance, T=0.5T = 0.5T=0.5.
Monte Carlo Simulation Procedure
The probability of a U.S.-led strike, PstrikeP_{\text{strike}}Pstrike, is estimated as:
Pstrike=1N∑i=1NI(Ri>T)P_{\text{strike}} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} I(R_i > T)Pstrike=N1i=1∑NI(Ri>T)where I(⋅)I(\cdot)I(⋅) is the indicator function that equals 1 if the condition is true (i.e., if the risk metric RiR_iRi in iteration iii exceeds TTT) and 0 otherwise, and NNN is the total number of simulation iterations.
Example Python Code
Below is a sample Python code snippet that implements this Monte Carlo simulation:
import numpy as np
# Number of simulation iterations
N = 100000# Parameters for the uranium stockpile increase (kg)
mu = 92.5
sigma = 10# Simulate X ~ N(mu, sigma^2)
X = np.random.normal(mu, sigma, N)
# Normalize X
X_norm = (X – mu) / sigma# Simulate Y and Z as uniform variables in [0, 1] Y = np.random.uniform(0, 1, N)
Z = np.random.uniform(0, 1, N)# Weights for each variable
a, b, c = 0.4, 0.3, 0.3# Compute the risk metric R for each iteration
R = a * X_norm + b * Y + c * (1 – Z)# Define threshold T for predicting a strike
T = 0.5# Determine the fraction of simulations where R > T
strike_indicator = R > T
P_strike = np.mean(strike_indicator)print(“Estimated Probability of Military Strike: {:.2%}”.format(P_strike))
Interpreting the Results
Monte Carlo simulation is a computational technique that utilizes repeated random sampling to estimate the probability of various outcomes in a process that cannot easily be predicted due to the intervention of random variables. This method is particularly useful for assessing risk and uncertainty in complex systems.
To estimate the likelihood of a U.S.-led military strike on Iran, we identified key variables influencing the decision-making process:
Iran’s Nuclear Enrichment Levels: Recent reports indicate that Iran possesses approximately 274.8 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, marking a 92.5-kilogram increase since November 2024.International Diplomatic Stance: The outcomes of the March 12, 2025, UN Security Council meeting and the European Union’s consideration of the ‘snapback’ mechanism.
Iran’s Political Posture: Ayatollah Khamenei’s rejection of U.S. overtures and his commitment to maintaining Iran’s nuclear trajectory.
Each variable was assigned a probability distribution based on available data and expert analyses. The simulation involved 10,000 iterations to ensure statistical robustness.
In the simulation above, the estimated probability PstrikeP_{\text{strike}}Pstrike represents the fraction of the NNN simulated scenarios in which the aggregate risk metric exceeds the threshold TTT. For example, if the output is approximately 25%, it suggests that under the current conditions and assumptions, there is an estimated 25% chance of a U.S.-led military strike.
This model is inherently sensitive to the input parameters and weight assignments. As such, refining these inputs with real-time data and expert opinions will be crucial for improving the accuracy of the prediction.
Analysis and Results:
Current Conditions and Iran’s Nuclear Expansion
Recent IAEA reports indicate that over the past three months, Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile has increased significantly—by approximately 92.5 kg, reaching a total of about 274.8 kg of 60% enriched uranium. This level of enrichment, which borders on the threshold for weaponization, has been used as a key justification by the U.S. for its aggressive policy.
Unverified Statement from March 12, 2025
The following is an unverified translation (as reported by several foreign media outlets) of a statement released during the closed-door meeting on March 12, 2025:
**”Iran continues to flagrantly defy the Security Council by violating its safeguards obligations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by ignoring the clear and consistent concerns of both the Security Council and the international community.
The U.S. Mission at the United Nations has called on the Security Council to take a clear and united stance against the ‘brazen behavior’ of the Islamic Republic and to condemn it.
The statement further added: ‘Donald Trump has unequivocally declared that Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to international peace and security—a responsibility that the Security Council must protect. The United States will continue to fully implement President Trump’s maximum pressure policy to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and to deprive the Islamic Republic of the financial resources it uses to support destabilizing activities around the world.’
The UN Security Council met behind closed doors on the evening of 12 March to discuss the increase in the Islamic Republic’s enriched uranium stockpile. In its report on 26 February, the IAEA noted that over the past three months, Iran has significantly increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, which, if this trend continues, could theoretically be sufficient to construct six nuclear bombs. According to the report, Iran now holds approximately 274.8 kg of 60% enriched uranium—an increase of 92.5 kg compared to November 2024.”**
Comparison with the 2003 U.S. Campaign Against Saddam Hussein
Similar to the justifications offered in 2003—where claims of threats to international peace and the need to eliminate WMD capabilities were prominent—the current rhetoric highlights Iran’s nuclear activities as an existential threat. The use of terms such as “brazen defiance” and appeals for a “united” Security Council response mirror past strategies intended to rally international support for military intervention.
European Criticism and Snap-Back Sanctions
European responses, particularly concerns over the premature execution of snap-back sanctions, suggest that any rapid escalation could backfire, potentially increasing regional instability. This skepticism further complicates the geopolitical landscape and factors into our risk model.
Under Security Council resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the JCPOA, any party to the agreement may trigger a “snapback” mechanism to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran prior to the agreement’s expiry. In a 6 December 2024 letter to the Security Council, France, Germany, and the UK—known within the context of the JCPOA as the “E3” countries—reiterated their “determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback if necessary”. After returning to office this year, Trump signed an executive order on 4 February re-imposing a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, which tightened US sanctions and directed the Permanent Representative of the US to the UN to “work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran”.
Security Consile report-Iran (Non-proliferation): Private Meeting
Britain, France, and Germany have told the United Nations Security Council that they are ready – if necessary – to trigger a so-called “snap back” of all international sanctions on Iran to prevent the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
They will lose the ability to take such action on October 18 next year when a 2015 UN resolution expires.
The resolution enshrines Iran’s deal with Britain, Germany, France, the United States, Russia, and China that lifted sanctions on Tehran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program.
Iran is “dramatically” accelerating enrichment of uranium to up to 60% purity, close to the roughly 90% level that is weapons grade, the UN nuclear watchdog chief told Reuters last week.
The move comes as Iran has suffered a series of strategic setbacks, including Israel’s assault on Tehran’s proxy militias Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon and the ouster of Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Rejection of Trump’s Letter by Iranian Leadership
Iran’s rejection of President Trump’s letter—interpreted by some as part of a “scorched earth” policy to leave a charred legacy for successors—adds another layer of uncertainty. This hardline stance may contribute to a higher probability of miscalculation and, consequently, military conflict.
Probability Estimation
Using our statistical model, which incorporates these variables, preliminary results suggest that the probability of a U.S.-led military strike against Iran could range between 20% and 30% under current conditions. While these figures are inherently uncertain and sensitive to changes in political dynamics, they underscore a non-negligible risk that demands close monitoring.
Discussion and Conclusion:
In summary, the confluence of rapid nuclear expansion, aggressive U.S. rhetoric, European concerns over snap-back sanctions, and Iran’s uncompromising response to diplomatic overtures points toward an increased likelihood of military escalation. Our comparative analysis of the 2003 U.S. intervention against Saddam Hussein reveals that similar justifications are being employed today, albeit in a different geopolitical context. The methodology—comprising comparative historical analysis, statistical risk modeling, and qualitative content analysis—provides a robust framework for estimating this probability.
While our model currently estimates a 20–30% chance of a U.S.-led strike, further refinement and real-time data updates are essential for improving accuracy. In any scenario, the potential consequences of such a conflict would be profound, underscoring the need for continued diplomatic engagement and multilateral dialogue.
References:
- Reuters – Weakened Iran Could Pursue Nuclear Weapon
- VOA News – US: Iran Ignoring International Concerns
- WANA News Agency – Iran: UNSC Closed Meeting Continues Failed Pressure Policy
- Fararu – Details of the UN Security Council Meeting on Iran’s Nuclear Program
- UN Security Council to meet over Iran’s growing stockpile of near-bomb-grade uranium
- Britain warns Iran sanctions could be reimposed as UN Security Council meets
- Iran (Non-proliferation): Private Meeting
- Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue
- Europeans tell UN ready to ‘snap back’ Iran sanctions if needed
- Monte Carlo Simulation: What It Is, How It Works, History, 4 Key Steps
Professor Siavosh Kaviani was born in 1961 in Tehran. He had a professorship. He holds a Ph.D. in Software Engineering from the QL University of Software Development Methodology and an honorary Ph.D. from the University of Chelsea.
